Will the inclusionary housing programs drive up the price of market housing?

This question has been carefully researched in the US. The empirical evidence there conclusively shows that there has been little to no impact on the price of housing in the municipalities that have adopted inclusionary zoning programs. [Read more…]

Ontario Legislative Background

The following review looks at the earlier legislative status of inclusionary zoning in Ontario.  It was written before the passage of the current IZ legislation in December 2016.  It examines the provisions of section 37 of the Planning Act, the most relevant OMB decision and the two precursory private members bills.

[Read more…]

British Columbia Legislation

The municipalities of British Columbia do not have the legislative authority to use mandatory inclusionary zoning. Although the term is used in the province, it has been inappropriately applied to other inclusionary practices that are only loosely related to inclusionary zoning and also far less demanding and effective.

The province did pass legislation in 1992, 1993 and 1994 making changes to the Vancouver Charter and its Municipal Act (now, the Local Government Act). These changes directed municipalities to plan for affordable housing, and authorized the use of various regulatory tools in providing for that housing.

According the explanatory guidelines accompanying the legislation, it enabled the use specifically of two inclusionary practices, with which inclusionary zoning is often confused:

1)  ‘density bonusing’:  Under this provision, municipalities are able to offer higher density in exchange for affordable housing, special needs housing, and/or other amenities.

2)  ‘comprehensive density zoning’:  Under this provision, municipalities are able to create customized zoning regulations for large, complex and/or multi-use redevelopment sites. This typically involves a negotiated re-zoning process, through which the municipalities offer the developer increased densities and other regulatory benefits in return for the provision of affordable housing and/or other amenities.

The first of these provisions is comparable to s37 of Ontario’s Planning Act, and the second in many ways is similar to Toronto’s ‘large sites policy’. Neither of these is considered to be inclusionary zoning in this province.

In a notable related matter, municipalities also were given the authority to enter into ‘housing agreements’ with developers when using these tools. Using these agreements, municipalities can secure the long-term affordability of the housing, both ownership and rental, provided by the developers. These agreements can be used to control such aspects as the tenure, management, price or rent, and eligibility of the occupants for an indefinite period.

Municipalities in Ontario lack comparable powers, and so their ability to protect long-term affordability is more limited.

A good example of a comprehensive development zoning policy can be found in Vancouver – particularly, in what was initially called its ‘20% Core Need Housing Policy’, but now its ‘Non-Market Housing Policy’. It is broadly similar to inclusionary zoning in that both rely on the development approval process to leverage the provision of affordable housing in what otherwise would be exclusively market-rate developments.

Beyond this, there are many very significant differences between the two. Unlike inclusionary zoning, Vancouver’s comprehensive development zoning typically has been:

  •  applied to selected sites, and not to all or most sites across the city;
  •  used to secure land for housing, not the housing units themselves;
  • dependent on government funding to build the housing, not solely through the use of regulatory concessions; and
  • used to provide housing on separate sites, not housing fully integrated with the market units.

Having said all this, and to add to the confusion, it must be acknowledged that there are a number of municipalities in the province that have implemented a form of voluntary inclusionary zoning. In these programs, developers are encouraged – but not required – to provide affordable housing through density increases and other incentives. The comparable voluntary programs in the US have been found to be far less productive than the mandatory programs, and so are no longer generally promoted there for that reason.  (See Mandatory vs Voluntary Programs.)

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Manitoba Legislation

The province of Manitoba has passed legislation authorizing the use of mandatory inclusionary zoning. This law came into effect on 5 December 2013 when the legislation received Royal Assent. This represents the first time, and only so far, that a province in this country has passed such enabling legislation.

The legislation, made through amendments to Manitoba’s The Planning Act and The City of Winnipeg Charter, provides the enables  all municipalities and planning districts in the province to pass by-laws that would require developers of new market residential developments to construct and provide a proportion for housing affordable to low and moderate income households.  Read the legislation.

The legislation is simple and straightforward, containing only these four key provisions:

  1. The zoning by-law for a new development may require that a specified percentage of the dwelling units are offered as affordable housing for low- and moderate-income households.
  2. The by-law also must contain a definition of affordable housing (or a way of determining when housing is affordable).
  3. The by-law may allow for modifications to the relevant specific development requirements, including permitted increased density, in return for the affordable housing.
  4. The development agreements associated with these development may set terms and conditions for the following
    • the provision of the affordable housing, including their number, type and extent; and
    • the measures required to maintain the long-term affordability of the affordable housing.

It is worth noting that these provisions enable, but do not require, the municipalities to use mandatory inclusionary zoning. Also, these municipalities apparently already have the authority to use incentive zoning, through which developers can be encouraged through incentives, but not required, to provide affordable housing.

The legislation establishes the essential provisions needed for the municipalities to create effective inclusionary programs, but before doing so, they will need to address regulations and procedures dealing with a number of other important aspects, including (but not limited to) these:

  • the affordable housing definition, including developing a serviceable yardstick;
  • the compliance alternatives, including especially the use of fees–in-lieu;
  • the potential cost-offsets;
  • the specific developments subject to the requirements;
  • the minimum design standards of the affordable housing units; and
  • the legal mechanisms for maintaining long-term affordability.

Because many of these aspects are complex, and in any case will also necessarily involve the province, the province should take the lead in developing appropriate approaches that can be used by all municipalities across the province, rather than expecting the municipalities to develop them one-by-one on their own.

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Issues

In this section, various contentious issues related to inclusionary zoning are addressed.  These include the following:

Mandatory vs Voluntary Programs

Inclusionary programs can be divided into two broad types:  mandatory and voluntary.  Although they share many characteristics, they differ in one fundamental aspect that significantly affects how effective they are in providing affordable housing.

The fundamental difference between the two is this:

  • Mandatory programs require the developers to provide affordable housing as a condition of receiving development approval, and then typically provide some form of regulatory concessions in return for that housing.
  • Voluntary programs (also called incentive-based or negotiated) encourage the developers to provide the affordable housing by using regulatory concessions as incentives.

This fundamental difference can be looked at it another way:   in the mandatory programs, the developers have no choice but to provide the affordable housing if they wish to build anything; while in the voluntary, they have the choice to build something but not all they might if they accepted the incentives.

Developers, who have consistently opposed mandatory programs, often have portrayed voluntary programs as an effective alternate. They argue that they could provide ample affordable housing on a voluntary basis, if only they were given sufficient concessions and favourable conditions.

Both approaches have been widely tried in the US, and after years of experience, there is ample and convincing evidence that the voluntary programs don’t work. The vast majority of voluntary programs have produced very little affordable housing, and generally much much less than the mandatory programs. As a consequence, voluntary programs are now generally dismissed as  a credible option.

It is true that a handful of voluntary programs have been productive but this can be explained by particular local conditions not replicable elsewhere or by other demanding policies or regulations. For example, some voluntary programs are coupled with growth management policies that place a heavy-weighting on the provision of affordable housing when determining what developments are allowed to go-ahead.

New York City’s voluntary program is relevant here. It has been the most productive of the voluntary programs to date, but it success have been tied particular circumstances: its extraordinarily high housing prices. These prices have induced some developers to offer the provision of affordable housing in return for the right to build a few more expensive units. Nevertheless, the city’s newly elected mayor has proposed changing it to a mandatory program because it has produced insufficient housing, and then only in certain parts of the city.

It also must be said there are many mandatory programs that also are not productive. They are unproductive when there is little or no housing development activity. They are also unproductive when the programs are poorly designed. For example, this can occur when smaller projects (say, those smaller than 30 or 50 units) are exempted, or developers are allowed to pay fees-in-lieu.

California Surveys

Two surveys of the inclusionary programs in California contain some relevant findings on this issue. Although these surveys do not cover the whole country, they are instructive because the state has about a third of the country’s total, including many of the earliest.

2006 Findings

The survey conducted in 20061 looked at the 170 then-known programs in the state.  These programs had been implemented in 32% of the local jurisdictions of the state.  Out of these programs, 130 (76%) were described as mandatory.  See the survey.

The survey found that 24 of these programs had been able to produce 10% or more of their new units as inclusionary housing. Of these programs, 22 were mandatory. (Although not stated by the survey, the 2 productive voluntary programs relied on growth management policies to produce the affordable housing.)

The 8 top-producing programs were mandatory. Although they represented less than 5% of the sample, they had produced 28% of the inclusionary units identified in the survey.

The report associated with the survey contains five recommendations for achieving an effective program. The first of these is to adopt a mandatory policy.

2003 Findings

The 2003 survey2 obtained responses from the 98 or the107 then-known programs. Out of these, 92 (94%) were found be mandatory.  See the survey.

All of the 15 most successful programs were mandatory.

Of the 6 voluntary programs, 3 had reported no production at all. Two of these specifically blamed the voluntary nature of their programs for the poor production despite the housing boom in their communities.

The report contains these two relevant conclusions:

  • “In general, jurisdictions with voluntary or incentive-only policies report that their policies did not produce the desired affordable housing.”
  • “In general, …. the voluntary programs do not cause market rate developers to build or facilitate affordable units unless including affordable housing makes an applications more competitive in the permit approval process.”

Expert Opinion

A number of major organizations in the US have endorsed the use of mandatory programs instead of voluntary programs. These include the following:

  • American Planning Association (APA);
  • PolicyLink;
  • National Institute for Housing;
  • Innovative Housing Institute;
  • Pratt Institute Centre for Community and Environmental Development;
  • Business and Professional People for the Public Interest (BPI); and
  • Urban Land Institute.

Many recognized experts (some writing for the above organizations) are also on the record for endorsing mandatory programs, include these:

  • David Rusk;
  • Alan Mallach;
  • Nico Calavita; and
  • Nick Brunick (BPI and APA).

Here are some of their comments:

  • David Rusk3: “Lesson #1: Enact a mandatory, not voluntary, IZ law. Voluntary programs don’t produce much inclusionary housing. They simply give spineless public officials political cover that “they’ve done something” while it’s “business as usual” for builders.”  See the speech.
  • Nicholas J. Brunick4: “Experience and research indicate mandatory inclusionary housing programs are more effective at generating a larger supply of affordable housing than voluntary programs… mandatory programs have produced more affordable units overall, as well as more units for a wider range of income levels within the affordability spectrum.”  See the paper.
  • PolicyLink5: “While voluntary programs receive less opposition from developers,
    mandatory policies have produced far more affordable units. Indeed, an analysis of programs nationally reveal voluntary programs only produce affordable units if they offer substantial subsidies to the developer, or function as a mandatory policy by making it difficult for developers to obtain discretionary building permits without including affordable units in their projects.”
  • Pratt Institute6: “An analysis of existing IZ programs nationally reveals the superior delivery power of mandatory inclusionary zoning… Jurisdictions that apply mandatory inclusionary zoning requirements to all residential development produce significantly more affordable units.”
  • Alan Mallach7: “From time to time it has been argued that the provision of affordable housing under inclusionary programs should not be required, but rather should be a voluntary decision by the developer… This approach, however, has a number of serious deficiencies. It is ineffective as a means of producing lower income housing, while simultaneously significantly compromising the predictability and rationality of the broader municipal planning process. Such studies that have been done on inclusionary zoning have consistently found that – in the absence of deep Federal housing subsidies – voluntary programs remained largely unutilized by developers.”
  • Urban Land Institute8:  “The program should be mandatory. Voluntary programs do not produce affordable housing.”

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  1. Non-Profit Housing Association of Northern California (NPH), California Coalition of Rural Housing (CCRH), Sacramento Housing Alliance and San Diego Housing Federation: “Affordable by Choice: Trends in Inclusionary Housing Programs”, 2007.
  2. CCRH and NPH: “Inclusionary Housing in California: 30 Years of Innovation”; 2003.
  3. David Rusk: “Nine Lessons for Inclusionary Zoning”; Keynote Remarks to the National Inclusionary Housing Conference; 5 October 2005.
  4. Nicholas J. Brunick: “The Inclusionary Housing Debate: The Effectiveness of Mandatory Programs over Voluntary Programs”; Zoning Practice, American Planning Association; September 2004.
  5. ‘Equitable Development Toolkit: Inclusionary Zoning’ on the PolicyLink website (www.policylink.org/EDTK/IZ).
  6. Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development and PolicyLink: “Increasing Housing Opportunity in New York City; The Case for Inclusionary Zoning”; Fall 2004.
  7. Alan Mallach: “Inclusionary Zoning in Burlington Vermont: Laying the Groundwork for an Inclusionary Zoning Ordinance”; prepared for City of Burlington; Aug 1988.
  8. John McIlwain (ULI Senior Research Fellow): “Inclusionary Zoning, Cure or Curse”; The Urban Land Institute (www.uli.org); 2005.

Mayor of Calgary endorses inclusionary zoning

Mayor Nenshi of Calgary supports bringing in mandatory inclusionary zoning to deal with the growing affordable housing crisis in the city.  He is the first big-city mayor in this country to favour inclusionary zoning so clearly.  He came to this position after trying but failing to encourage the development industry to help voluntarily through moral suasion. [Read more…]

Is Inclusionary Zoning Inclusionary?

Heather L. Schwartz, et al:  Is Inclusionary Zoning Inclusionary?  A Guide for Practitioners;  The RAND Corporation; 2012.

This study, through an analysis of the impact of 11 representative inclusionary programs across the US, examines who these programs have benefitted, and how well they have fostered social inclusiveness.  Read the report

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Impact of Inclusionary Zoning

There are a number of authoritative reports coming out of the US that examine the impact of inclusionary housing programs on the price and production of market housing.   They all come to the same conclusion:  based on the empirical evidence available from the extensive US  experience, these programs have had very little or no impact on either production or price.

The most important of these reports are the following:

  • Vicki Been, et al.:  The Effects of Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets:  Lessons from the San Francisco, Washington DC and Suburban Boston Areas; Furman Center for Real Estate & Urban Policy, Working Paper 07-05, November 2007.  Read the report.  Read a precis.
  • Gerrit-Jan Knaap, et al:  Housing Impacts of Inclusionary Zoning; National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education; February 2008.  Read the report.  Read a precis.
  • David Rosen:   Inclusionary Housing and its Impact on Housing and Land Markets;  NHC Affordable Housing Policy Review; February 2004.  Read the paper.
  • Nicholas Brunick:  The Impact of Inclusionary Zoning on Development; Business and Professional People for the Public Interest; 2003.  Read the paper.

Not only is there is empirical evidence that inclusionary zoning has very little or no impact on prices and production, there is an entirely reasonable and understandable explanation why this is so.  This explanation is provided in the following excerpts taken from reports that can be found on this website.

Taken from David Rosen’s Inclusionary Housing and its Impact on Housing and Land Markets:

“Some policymakers and developers concerned with the adoption of inclusionary housing assert that it will drive up the price of apartments and homes. This assertion is belied by the fundamentals of real estate market supply and demand. The price of housing is not a function of its development cost. Rather, housing price, be it rents or sale prices, are solely a function of market demand. For example, a developer may experience an increase in construction interest from that contained in his or her development pro forma. That developer can no more pass along the “cost increase” of higher than projected interest rates to renters or homebuyers than could be done for a “cost increase” associated with inclusionary housing. … Conversely, no one expects a developer enjoying lower than projected interest costs to lower rents or home prices accordingly.”

“Developers and landlords already charge the maximum rents and sales prices the market will bear. Therefore, any increase in development costs resulting from government regulation or other factors, will ultimately impact the price of land and/or profits to developers and owners, and cannot be passed on to the consumer.”

Taken from From Nico Calavita and Alan Mallach’s Inclusionary Housing, Incentives, and Land Value Recapture:

“… There is little doubt that there are costs associated with complying with a municipality’s inclusionary requirement. While developers often maintain that renters or buyers of market-rate units bear the cost of IH, economists point out that the developer, under most circumstances, absorb part or all of these costs. There seems to be agreement in the literature that in the long run … most of these costs will be passed backward to the owners of land.”

“A strong argument in support of this position is that a rationale developer will already charge the maximum housing price that the market can bear, and thus will be unable to pass along additional costs through higher prices. Under these circumstances, if newly imposed exactions increase the cost of development, either the price of the land or the developer’s profits will have to come down. While the developers may reduce their profit margins, it is likely that wherever possible they will seek a reduction in land costs. Critics of IH maintain that these represent unreasonable and unfair outcomes, while proponents argue that it is neither unfair nor unreasonable for the landowners to bear much of the cost of inclusionary programs.”

The Canadian Home Builders Association commissioned Altus Clayton in 2008 to write a report critical of inclusionary housing programs.  Entitled “The Potential Effects of Inclusionary Zoning in Canada“, the central conclusion of this report is that these programs will have a serious adverse impact of the price and production of housing.   This conclusion was based largely on conjecture, as the consultants undertook no original research and ignored the authoritative reports and hard empirical evidence that spoke to the contrary.  Separate critiques examining the many flaws and distortions of this report have been prepared by Richard Drdla and by David Rusk, a leading American expert on inclusionary housing.  Read the Drdla critique.    Read the Rusk critique.

 

A Guide to Developing Inclusionary Housing Programs

Richard Drdla Associates:  A Guide to Developing Inclusionary Housing Programs; Acorn Institute Canada:  September 2010.  

This guide examines the main features of  inclusionary housing that should be addressed, together with the main principles and key practices that should be followed, to implement a productive program.    The material draws to a large extent upon the best practices widely used across the US in their inclusionary zoning programs.   This guide was prepared through funding provided by the Catherine Donnelly Foundation.  Read the report